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1.  INTRODUCTION 
  Firms engage in both market and "nonmarket” strategies to create shareholder 
value (Spulber 1994; Baron 1996).  Whereas market strategies involve decisions such as 
product positioning and pricing, nonmarket strategies are actions taken by the firm in its 
political, regulatory and social environments for the purpose of increasing firm value 
(Baron 1997, 1999).  Nonmarket behavior includes such company activities as lobbying a 
legislator or regulator, litigating a case in court, and making campaign contributions.   
Two aspects to understanding nonmarket activity are (1) “how much” nonmarket 
behavior firms are likely to undertake, and (2) whether nonmarket activity will be done 
individually or collectively within the industry.  These questions are important as they 
relate to both firm strategy and the boundaries of the firm. We apply these questions to 
the lobbying of the Federal Communications Commission (FCC) by firms. In particular, 
we examine the number of FCC lobbying contacts by firms and in what organizational 
forms (trade associations v. individual firm) the lobbying occurs.   
  The current theory on lobbying tends to be focused on the amount of lobbying 
that occurs, and has largely omitted the options firms have to organize their lobbying.  
Since the seminal work of Olson (1965), the literature has focused on the ability of 
individuals and groups to overcome the free-rider problem in creating collective action 
(Bendor and Mookherjee 1987, Sandler 1992, Sandler and Tschirhart 1980).  While the 
collective action literature has much to say about the amount of lobbying that occurs, it is 
less informative when it comes to the organization of lobbying.  The theories articulating 
the free-rider problem do not address whether firms will choose to internalize the 
lobbying function, or choose to do it through a common body.  The only conclusion that  
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can be made from the literature is that less lobbying occurs when there are collective 
action problems.  
  The empirical literature on the subject has been no more informative.  Because of 
the difficulty in obtaining data on lobbying activities, most empirical studies that examine 
the amount and organization of corporate political activity have focused on political 
action committee (PAC) contributions to legislators (Strattman 1992, Kroszner and 
Strattman 1998, Snyder 1990, Grier, Munger and Roberts 1994, Pittman 1976). This 
literature has found evidence consistent with the collective action theories in the amount 
of contributions PACs give to legislators. They have also found evidence that support the 
theories of production economics, such as economies of scale, in the amount of PAC 
contributions made.  That is, empirical studies have shown that larger firms do give more 
to legislators (Grier et al 1994, Schuler 1999). Those handful of published studies which 
have examined lobbying have not examined lobbying directly or have only conducted 
descriptive (yet valuable) case studies (e.g. Hansen 1991, Schlozman and Tierney 1986, 
Coleman 1988, Walker 1991, Maitland 1985).  
In this paper, we address these shortcomings by examining the power of the 
collective action theories and transaction cost economics theory to predict both the 
quantity and organization of lobbying, while controlling for other explanations.  We build 
hypotheses based on the predictions of these two theories, and then we test them using a 
data set of “ex parte” lobbying presentations at the Federal Communications Commission 
in early 1998.  This data set contains over 900 instances of lobbying on over 100 different 
issues before the FCC.  We find that both collective action and transaction cost  
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economics theories help to explain the amount and organization of lobbying by larger 
firms, but that there are limits to these theories, especially with respect to small firms.  
This article extends the study of corporate lobbying in a number of ways.  First, it 
is the first paper to examine lobbying at the transactional or contact level.  Second, using 
multivariate statistical techniques we examine how both collective action problems and 
transactional hazards affect the quantity and organization of lobbying.  Third, we study 
lobbying of regulators instead of Congress, as has been done by every other large sample 
empirical study.  Finally, rather than use PAC proxies for lobbying, we measure the 
actual quantity and organization of the lobbying effort, making this one of the first 
studies to examine actual lobbying events statistically.    
 
II. THEORY 
  The collective action and the transaction costs theories are alternative, although 
not mutually exclusive, approaches for understanding organizational issues.  Each has 
implications for both the quantity and organizational form of lobbying of federal 
regulators.  In the remainder of the paper we will define quantity of lobbying as the 
number of contacts an individual firm or trade association makes with the FCC. By the 
term individual firms, we include those contacts made by either in-house or outside 
counsel or lobbyists to make contacts.  By trade associations, we mean the multi-member 
industry organization to which firms from the industry contribute money and support for 
the greater benefit of the industry as a whole.  Examples of such include the National 
Association of Broadcasters, the American Cable Association, and the United States 
Telephone Association.   
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  A. Collective Action Theory 
  Collective action theory emphasizes the barriers to group action and how they are 
overcome (Olson 1965).  A requirement to achieve group action is for there to be 
common interests amongst firms.  Divergent interests amongst firms generally means that 
a regulatory policy will differentially impact their businesses. We can think of rules 
regarding unbundling of network elements as an example.  The effect of unbundling the 
elements and charging for them separately will differentially affect companies that have 
heavy investments in modern switching equipment, companies that maintain legacy 
systems in rural areas, and competitive local exchange carriers who wish to offer local 
service.  Indeed, each company may have its own view on what is a network element and 
how unbundled it has to be.  Such conflict over policy outcomes will have two effects: 
one, multiple viewpoints will be expressed to regulators; and two, the likelihood of acting 
collectively (through a trade association) is reduced because members are not motivated 
to work together for each other's goals. This leads to the following proposition. 
 
Hypothesis 1. If the policy goals of individual firms are not consistent on an issue, 
then: 
(a) firms tend to lobby individually, and thus favor internal organization, and 
(b) the amount of lobbying on an issue increases (due to the multiple 
viewpoints from multiple actors) 
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While divergent interests has received some attention in the collective action 
literature, the mainstay of the literature concerns the free-riding problem. For a given 
level of interest convergence, collective action will be difficult because individuals will 
attempt to free ride on the group effort.  When the cost to lobbying is high, and the 
benefits are cannot be localized, no one will have the incentive to engage in political 
activity, and thus little lobbying will occur.  Individuals will not lobby on their own, 
either because the cost is too high relative to the benefit or because they believe another 
firm will do the bidding for them. In equilibrium, no lobbying occurs because of this free-
riding behavior. Note that the literature does not make a prediction how the ability to free 
ride affects the organization of lobbying.  This then leads to the following theoretical 
prediction that has been carried through the literature: 
 
Hypothesis 2: The greater the potential for free-riding, the less lobbying that will 
occur. 
 
  There may be issues, however, where the solution to the free-riding problem may 
be supported by the organization chosen.  We examine two possibilities in this paper.  
First, if the benefits conferred by the trade association (such as information, studies, 
special lobbying and policy benefits) can be allocated solely to the participating members 
of the association, then individual firms have an incentive to participate in group action, 
thereby overcoming the free-riding problem. If individual firms defect, they would not 
get the benefits of the collective body.  Second, if selective benefits can be obtained by  
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lobbying individually, individual firms may engage in lobbying individually.  These two 
possibilities can occur separately or together. 
 
Hypothesis 3A:  If the benefits from trade association lobbying (collective action) 
can be allocated solely to the participating members of the association, then:  
(1) lobbying by a trade association will be favored, 
(2) there will be an increase in the amount of lobbying because the free rider 
problem is mitigated  
 
Hypothesis 3B: If firms can obtain unique and selective benefits by lobbying 
individually, then: 
(1)  lobbying by individual firms will be favored 
(2)  there will be an increase in the amount of lobbying because the free rider 
problem is mitigated 
 
  B. Transaction Cost Theory  
  The transaction cost approach to organizational issues is more comparative in its 
analysis, emphasizing the benefits of alternative organizational choices.  In its more 
standard economic applications, this approach addresses the "make or buy" decision -- 
that is, the decision of the firm to either internalize production or purchase goods and 
services on the market. This perspective suggests that in an effort to promote efficiency 
in firm governance, the objective for the firm is to match organizational forms (ranging 
from market to hierarchy) with any transaction “hazards” facing the firm in making  
  9 
agreements, or contracts, with others. The contracting hazards are many, some related to 
maladaptation in the presence of specific assets (Klein, Crawford and Alchian 1978; 
Williamson 1985, 1996), some related to the appropriation of property rights (Teece 
1986, Oxley 1997), and still others related to measurement of performance (Holmstrom 
and Milgrom 1991). These factors often call for the internalization of a particular 
transaction (or lobbying activities in our case). The hazard particular to our analysis is the 
appropriation of proprietary information by a party to the lobbying transaction  -- that is, 
appropriation of proprietary information by other members of a trade association.  When, 
the revelation of proprietary information is required for effective lobbying, the trade 
association may become less attractive as an organizational choice.  The information 
dissemination and disclosure mechanisms within the trade association would increase the 
probability that proprietary competitive information of the firm (e.g., future pricing 
strategies or new market entries) necessary for effective lobbying would be divulged, or 
"leaked," to other members of the trade association -- the firm's competitors.  An 
individual firm would find it difficult to depend upon trade association agents to prevent 
leakage because the agents have multiple principles (industry competitors).  Thus, if 
competitive proprietary information is involved in the lobbying process, the trade 
association is a poor governance vehicle.1  
  While internal governance or “gun for hire” may be better able to protect internal 
information, it has an additional attractive feature: better incentive properties than trade 
associations. Contracting out the lobbying effort is particularly attractive because the 
profits (for work done efficiently) or the inflated returns from contingent fees (for work 
                                                 
1 We could see a similar finding with specialization, and the role of specific information in lobbying 
affecting the organization of the lobbying.  
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done successfully in the case of lawyering) accrue to the agent, thus creating the 
incentive for the agent to perform more efficiently.2  The incentive to specialize is higher 
in repeated transactions than in one-shot transactions.  While the incentives to operate in 
an integrated firm are not as high as in a contractual relationship, they are still higher than 
that of a trade association.  There is a single principal monitoring effort and there is a 
unified goal to the company.  Incentives for the trade association as an agent for 
individual firms, by contrast, will tend to be muted as each member tugs at the trade 
association to become a lobbying arm for its own interests. 
  This is not to say that the trade association is a lost cause.  It conveys many 
advantages. When acting individually, the firm incurs organizational costs that are 
relatively high, as they must maintain a legal or government affairs department and its 
associated administrative costs.  If the use of lawyers and lobbyists is infrequent, the 
costs of internalizing these functions are most likely too burdensome to take on.  The 
trade association, by comparison, is able to distribute costs across members and avoid 
these problems.  Moreover, it is able to carry significant political weight because it has 
large amounts of geographical coverage in its political coalition.  These all mean that the 
trade association can act as a cost effective mechanism for lobbying, and indeed, will 
often be the default case.  We summarize this discussion in Table 1. 
  Transaction cost theory, then, predicts the organizational form of lobbying in the 
following way.   
 
                                                 
2  The firm may encounter other principal-agent problems when the lawyers work on contingency, such as 
settling when it is in the best interest of the firm to litigate (Dana and Spier 1993).   
  11 
Hypothesis 4: For a given level of cost and convergent interest, when there is 
proprietary information at risk, lobbying in the integrated form will be 
favored over a trade association form. 
 
  Finally, we consider the direct effect of proprietary information.  Firms are 
generally reticent to lobby at all when there is proprietary information at stake, because 
there is fear that despite the usual protections to safeguard this information, the secrets 
will either intentionally or unintentionally leak out from the agency (Demski, Lewis, 
Yao, and Yildirim 1999, de Figueiredo and Teece 1996).  Thus, no matter which form of 
organization is chosen we can hypothesize: 
 
Hypothesis 5:  The more proprietary information at risk, the less lobbying that 
will occur. 
 
C.  Extensions and Summary 
Although the collective action theory and transaction cost theories are treated as 
independent phenomenon in this section, there is a strong possibility that they may be 
interrelated.  That is, the choice of organization may affect the amount of lobbying that 
occurs.  When firms choose to use a trade association as the vehicle to communicate with 
regulators, they may no longer each need to mobilize lobbying efforts individually to 
make their position known.  Instead, the collective body made up of many organizations 
can lobby on the group’s behalf.  Conversely, if each firm made a decision to lobby 
internally, it would then increase the amount of lobbying that would occur.  Given this  
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potential link between the organization of lobbying and the amount of lobbying, we 
propose: 
 
Hypothesis 6: The more firms choose trade association lobbying, the less 
lobbying that will occur; the more firms choose internal organization 
lobbying, the more lobbying which will occur. 
 
In Figure 1, we explain the expected results that will occur.  Note that each 
variable has an effect on organization, and that each variable affects the amount of 
lobbying in two ways.  First, indirectly through the organization, the variable affects the 
amount of lobbying (trade association lobbying produces fewer total contacts than 
multiple individual lobbying).  Second, it affects the amount of lobbying directly.  In 
some cases the direct and indirect effects of the variables affect lobbying in opposite 
directions, and it is an empirical question to determine the net effect. 
A final comment must be made regarding large and small firms.  First, 
theoretically, one would predict there would be differences in the two samples.  Small 
firms might be severely budget constrained in their ability to hire full time lobbyists and 
may not have the sufficient economies of scale required to support an internal lobbyist.  
Thus, they may not have organizational choice.  For them, it may be the trade association 
or nothing.  Second, smaller firms might also behave in less sophisticated ways than their 
more experienced and larger counterparts.   Without the frequent experience and learning 
that accompanies continual and active federal regulation, small firms might not behave as  
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theoretically expected.  Because of this, the difference between large and small firms has 
been highlighted in the empirical exposition that follows.  
 
III. EMPIRICAL EVIDENCE ON THE ORGANIZATION OF LOBBYING 
 
  A.  Lobbying at the FCC 
The empirical setting for the paper is lobbying of the Federal Communications 
Commission (FCC).  The FCC is charged with regulating the telecommunications sector3 
and has actively promulgated rules and regulations governing market actions of 
companies.4  Before the FCC renders a decision on a docket, there is a formal and 
informal comment procedure for the parties potentially affected.  The Code of Federal 
Regulations and FCC Guidelines establish a set of formal procedures that must be 
followed to comment on, or challenge, an FCC ruling. The informal procedure is a bit 
more opaque.  Parties are permitted to make ex parte presentations to the FCC.  These 
written or oral presentations can be to any official within the FCC, from the 
commissioners who make the final rulings, to the industry-level bureau officials, who are  
                                                 
3 There are actually many industries within telecommunications, such as wireless telecommunications, long 
distance provision, local service, broadcast television, radio services, and so on. 
4 For example, between 1990 and 1993, the FCC handed down an average of over 1000 regulatory 
decisions per year.  See the FCC Record for the text of those decisions.  Also see Greenstein, McMaster, 
and Spiller 1995, for an example of the impact of regulatory decisions in the telecommunications sector.  



























Figure 1:  Predictions of the Theory  
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industry experts who help craft the ruling for the Commission.  Ex parte contacts by the 
telecommunications industry constitute the lobbying activities we examine here.  
Ex parte contacts, as a measure of lobbying, have several attractive properties for 
empirical research of this type.  First, because all contacts are required by federal 
regulation to be reported, there is not a sample selection bias problem.  Second, the 
Secretary of the FCC provides uniform and consistent information on each ex parte 
presentation, minimizing the problem of missing and temporally inconsistent data.   
Finally, all contacts relate to a particular regulatory issue before the FCC and are reported 
as such.  This allows us to investigate each and every instance of this primary form of 
lobbying.   
We have collected data on every ex parte presentation made to an FCC official 
and reported to the Secretary’s Office in January and February 1998.  This includes 
presentations made by parties spanning from December 1997 to February 1998.  (There is 
roughly a 15-day delay from lobbying contact to public disclosure by the FCC.)  These 
lobbying contacts cover 111 individual dockets facing the FCC.  Ten dockets have been 
eliminated because of incomplete information, yielding 101 distinct issues over which the 
FCC was lobbied.  The issue is the unit of observation. 
In this data set, there are 930 lobbying contacts made during the time period.  We 
record a contact as the following: each party, i, that contacts regulator, j, about issue, k, 
on date, t, receives a count in the data set (each (i,j,k,t) quadruplet represents a count).  
Because we are concerned about business lobbying, we have eliminated observations that 
involve lobbying by federal, state or local government representatives.  We have also 
eliminated 12 cases where information is incomplete.  The remaining number of contacts  
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is 823.  We supplemented this database with interviews of over thirty regulators, 
companies, lawyers, and trade associations in the telecommunications industry, to derive 
the key variables of interests. 
To create and check some of the variables, we recruited three individuals: one 
former FCC regulator, one current FCC regulator, and one lawyer who represented 
companies on many of these issues.  For each of the docket numbers, we asked two of the 
officials to rate the variables on a Likert Scale (1 to 5).  High ratings mean that the 
experts strongly agreed with the characterization of the variable in the questionnaire; low 
numbers indicate a strong disagreement. We used the average of the two experts’ results 
to determine the values of the variables. The raw data had a reasonably high degree of 
consistency, with 81% of answers within one rating point and 95% of answers within two 
rating points.  The questions used in this study from the original questionnaire are found 
in Appendix 1.  We then asked the remaining official to take a version of the 
questionnaire with the same, but a smaller number of questions.  We then checked his 
answers with the results from the previous two individuals to insure consistency with the 
answers.   Again, the results were similar. 
 
  B. The Data on the Organization of Lobbying 
The unit of observation is the issue docket (n=101).  The dependent variable in 
this section is the percentage of individual firm contacts of the total contacts on a given 
issue, and is defined as (number of individual firm contacts/number of total contacts).  
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There are three sets of independent variables.  The first set of variables, derived 
from the questionnaire in Appendix 1, relates to measuring how collective action issues 
and their remedies affect the organization of lobbying.  Collective action itself has two 
main components, the degree of shared interests, and the degree of free-riding.  We 
measure both.  The first variable, SHARED INTERESTS, measures the degree of shared 
interests between firms on a given issue.  We expect that as SHARED INTERESTS 
increase, ceteris paribus, firms are more likely to engage in collective action, and thus 
companies move toward a trade association form of organization (Hypothesis 1).  The 
second component, free-riding, is measured by the variable, FREE RIDING.  While the 
theory has no prediction on how free-riding will affect the organization of lobbying 
(Hypothesis 2), we include a FREE RIDING variable in the regression for completeness.  
FREE RIDING examines the ability of non-contributors to enjoy the fruits of lobbying by 
others.  Although opportunities for free-riding may not favor one organizational form 
over another, remedies of the free-riding problem – nonmember exclusion and unique 
benefits -- may.  To account for this, we introduce the two remedy variables.   
NONMEMBER EXCLUSION represents whether it is possible for a group, like a trade 
association, to exclude members from benefits of its lobbying efforts, and thus overcome 
the free-riding problem.  If trade associations are able to exclude nonmembers from the 
benefits of their lobbying effort, firms are more likely to join the trade association and 
rely on its lobbying efforts (Hypothesis 3A).  Thus we expect a negative coefficient on 
NONMEMBER EXCLUSION.  UNIQUE BENEFITS measures the ability of firms to 
obtain selective benefits on this issue from their own lobbying efforts (Hypothesis 3B).  
We expect a positive coefficient on UNIQUE BENEFITS because a firm could obtain  
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unique benefits through lobbying on its own.5  Note that the two remedies are not 
mutually exclusive and a firm could use both a trade association to obtain industry-wide 
benefits (when nonmember exclusion is possible) and an internal organization form of 
lobbying to obtain selective benefits.   
The second set of independent variables focuses on proprietary information; in 
particular, the difficulty of protecting information when lobbying.  In measuring this 
transactional hazard, we asked the experts to assess whether lobbying on each of the 
issues is likely to lead to leakage of proprietary information during lobbying, outside of 
FCC safeguards that protect proprietary information.  WEAK APPROPRIABILITY 
measures the likelihood that lobbying through a trade association will result in 
proprietary information revelation, with high values indicating a high probability of 
proprietary information leakage.  The transactional theory argues that we should see the 
trade association form of organization disfavored when there is a transactional hazard of 
proprietary information leakage in the lobbying (Hypothesis 5).  If this were true, we 
would expect to see a positive coefficient on WEAK APPROPRIABILITY, as firms that 
face higher transactional hazards tend to shy away from trade association forms of 
lobbying.  We do include a second variable FIRM LEAKAGE to measure whether firms, 
in lobbying internally, would have to reveal proprietary information anyway.  Thus, if a 
firm feels its proprietary information will leak out to its competitors anyway, it will be 
more likely to use the trade association, ceteris paribus, over an internal organization 
form of lobbying to take advantage of the least cost option available. 
                                                 
5 Note that unique benefits does not necessarily mean divergent interests.    
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The third set of variables is control variables.  The first three variables – LARGE 
FIRM COST OF ACTION, SMALL FIRM COST OF ACTION, and COST OF 
ORGANIZING -- control for the cost of acting collectively.  In particular, LARGE FIRM 
COST OF ACTION and SMALL FIRM COST OF ACTION measure if a large or small 
firm, respectively, would find it cost-beneficial to lobby individually in the absence of a 
trade association.  COST OF ORGANIZING measures how the costs increase in the trade 
association form as a function of the number of members of the trade association.  As 
costs to the trade association form of organizing increase, and the costs of organizing 
internally decrease, the firm should move toward an internal form of organization. 
LARGE FIRMS and SMALL FIRMS measure the number of large and small firms 
affected, respectively, and are designed to control for issues before the Commission that 
disproportionately affect either large or small firms.  FIRM PROFITS measures the 
impact of an issue on firm profits; larger values of this variable indicate the larger the 
effect of this issue on firm profits (and arguably should increase lobbying due to 
importance of issue). YEAR represents the number of years the docket has been before 
the Commission.  This is a measure of where in the docket life cycle the issue is, and is 
meant to control for any organizational effects that might be attendant to that particular 
phase.  Finally, we include control variables that are not on the questionnaire.  First, we 
control for docket (or industry) effects fixed effects.  COMMON CARRIER, 
ENGINEERING AND TECHNOLOGY, MASS MEDIA, WIRELESS, and CABLE 
SERVICES refer to the docket designation of the issue, and control for these types of 
industry effects, relative to miscellaneous agency issues (which includes international, 
public mobile radio, compliance, and other minor bureaus), the omitted category.    
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  We provide three tables regarding the data.  Table 2 has a list of the variable 
names, and what they measure.  Table 3 contains the descriptive statistics.  Table 4 is the 
correlation matrix.   
 
C.   Empirical Method and Specification 
In order to estimate the equation, we use four methods.  The first is a standard 
tobit regression, assuming normal error distribution.  We use the tobit formulation 
because the dependent variable includes those situations in which there is lobbying, but 
no large firm has taken part.  In 27 of the 101 observations, there is no lobbying by large 
firms.6  This means there is a large probability mass at 0, which could result in biased 
estimates in the standard OLS formulation. The normal tobit formulation allows us to 
account for a distribution that is censored from the left, and allows us to generate 
unbiased parameter estimates.  Sigma is positive and statistically significant at the 99% 
level in the tobit formulation, suggesting biased estimators in OLS. We also consider a 
censored logistic regression, which assumes a logistic error distribution. 
A second concern that might arise is that there is censoring from the right as well.  
Twenty-four of the 101 observations are equal to one.  That is, in 24 cases, only large 
firms lobby with internal organization, which creates a large probability mass at 1.  To 
account for this, we consider a two-sided tobit, which allows for censoring at 0 and at 1. 
Finally, we provide the ordinary least squares estimation as a basis for comparison, with 
Newey-West AR-4/heteroskedastic consistent errors. 
                                                 
6 In these cases, large firms might wish to lobby, but the costs to doing so outweigh benefits.  
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We have also bifurcated the sample into a small and large firm sample.  The large 
firm sample includes all Fortune 1000 firm contacts and all trade association contacts in 
which large firms are participants.  The small firm sample includes all Fortune 1000 
firms and all trade associations in which small firms are participants. We have done this 
for four reasons.  First, theoretically, one would predict there would be differences in the 
two samples.  Small firms might be severely capital constrained in their ability to hire 
lobbyists and not have the sufficient economies of scale required to support an internal 
lobbyist.  Second, smaller firms might also behave in less sophisticated ways than their 
more experienced and larger counterparts. Third, our interviews tend to confirm that, 
when compared to large firms, smaller firms are more often concerned about the social 
and trust aspects to their relationships with trade associations, rather than a merely 
calculative strategy.  Finally, we have determined that there is a statistical difference in 
the two samples.  We have examined a unified model’s explanatory power using 
interactive variables for the theoretical variables of interest versus no interactive variables 
on the variables of interest, and we can reject with a simple F-test that the models have 
similar explanatory power at the 99% level of confidence.   
Finally, we have also examined the variables for multicollinearity.  While a 
concern, it does not seem to be a large problem.  Table 3 indicates that the highest 
correlation between two variables is .81, most variables have bivariate correlations in the 
.30 range or lower. 
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D. Organizational  Results 
  1.  Large Firms 
We first look at large firms.  In Table 5 we provide six models.  Model 1 is the 
base model, without the collective action or transactional hazard variables, using a simple 
one-sided tobit.  Model 2 includes the collective action variables of interest.  Model 3 
includes all the variables of interest.  Model 4 presents the results with a two-sided tobit.  
Model 5, considers a one-sided censored logistic regression.  Model 6 provides the OLS 
estimation for comparison.  The coefficients estimates are presented with their standard 
errors in parenthesis below.  The statistical significance of the coefficients is noted at the 
10% and 5% level using two-sided t-tests.  A positive coefficient means that an increase 
in the variable will cause the lobbying to tend toward internal organization; a negative 
coefficient means that an increase in the variable will result in a more trade association 
form of organization. We focus on Model 3 as it has all the variables included and 
highest likelihood. Note, however, that the signs of the coefficients are the same in nearly 
every model, no matter which error distribution assumption or specification is preferred. 
  Consider first the collective action variables.  SHARED INTERESTS, as 
predicted, has a negative coefficient and is statistically significant, which suggests that as 
interests converge, firms are more likely to move into a trade association form of 
organization (Hypothesis 1).  The coefficient on FREE RIDING is negative and 
statistically significant, meaning that the greater the possibility of free-riding on a docket 
outcome, the more likely the firm is to use the trade association.  The theory did not pose 
a prediction on this variable.  The coefficient on NONMEMBER EXCLUSION, also 
negative and statistically significant, suggests that as trade associations are increasingly  
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able to block nonmembers from their benefits, firms respond by joining the trade 
association and having the trade association lobby on its behalf, consistent with the 
theory (Hypothesis 3A).  The coefficient on UNIQUE BENEFITS is not statistically 
different from zero at the conventional levels of significance.  The theory had predicted 
this coefficient would be positive – that is, unique benefits would produce a tendency for 
firms to lobby themselves to obtain those benefits (Hypothesis 3B).    
  Consider the transaction cost variables next.  The coefficient on WEAK 
APPROPRIABILITY, which is the key measure of the transaction cost variable, is 
positive, as predicted, and statistically significant at the 90% level of confidence 
(Hypothesis 4).  Though not an overwhelming level of significance for large firms, the 
coefficient is positive and statistically significant at either the 90% or 95% level of 
confidence in every model presented.  The coefficient suggests that firms will organize 
internally or through their own agents, rather than use a trade association, the more 
proprietary information is at stake.  FIRM LEAKAGE has a negative coefficient that is 
statistically significant at the 90% level.  When firms who would lobby individually are 
unable to keep the proprietary information from regulators, they are likely to rely on a 
trade association form of lobbying, consistent with theory  
  Table 6 lists the magnitude of the effects a one-standard-deviation move in the 
theoretical variables has on the probability of lobbying internally.  A one-standard 
deviation move in shared interests, free-riding, and nonmember exclusion results in a 
14%, 28%, and 16% greater probability of organizing the lobbying through a trade 
association form, respectively.  Consistent with transaction cost theory, a one-standard 
deviation move in proprietary information revelation increases the probability of  
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organizing internally or through an own-hired agent by 16% for large firms.  If it is not 
possible to keep the information proprietary no matter what the organizational form, 
firms prefer to lobby through a trade association with a 22% higher probability. 
A number of control variables are also of interest.  The coefficient on LARGE 
FIRMS is positive and significant.  The more large firms affected by the issue, the more 
likely they are to organize internally. The coefficient on YEAR is also positive and 
statistically relevant.  The later in the life cycle of the docket, the more likely firms are to 
organize their lobbying internally.  The Common Carrier Bureau and the Wireless 
Telecommunications Bureau also encounter more integrated lobbying from large firms.  
Note that the impact of the docket on firm profits (FIRM PROFITS) does not favor one 
type of organization over another. 
 
2. Small  Firms 
Now consider small firms.  Again, in Table 7 we present six models (Models 7-
12), that follow Table 5.  SIGMA is statistically significant for small firms as well 
suggesting a Tobit formulation.  A log-likelihood ratio test does not allow us to reject the 
hypothesis that all the tobit models have similar explanatory power at the 95% level of 
confidence.  That is, Model 7 has similar explanatory power to Models 8-9.  From a 
modeling perspective, this suggests that jointly the theoretical variables have little 
explanatory power of small firm behavior.  Different models have similar results, but 
those results seem to be fraught with problems.  For example, the coefficient on 
NONMEMBER EXCLUSION is positive and statistically significant, suggesting that the 
more benefits trade associations offer, the less likely smaller firms are to join.  FREE   
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RIDING among small firms has a positive and also statistically significant coefficient, 
suggesting small firms, in the presence of free-riding, tend to organize internally. To the 
extent that collinearity might be a problem, it should have plagued the large firm analysis 
as well as the small firm analysis.  However, the large firm analysis seems to perform 
well.  Given this outcome, the discussion of individual coefficients and variables, and 
how they affect the organization of lobbying, must be interpreted carefully because 
jointly they add little to our understanding of the organization of small firms.  The reason 
underlying this could be that there is so much unobserved heterogeneity in the behavior 
of small firms, that it completely swamps the theoretical effects, and thus generates 
nonsense results.  These results are also consistent with the view that small firms do 
indeed behave differently than large firms.  It could be that they may be limited in their 
choices of organization, or that they are maximizing a utility function that does not 
include these variables. 
 
IV. EMPIRICAL EVIDENCE ON THE QUANTITY OF LOBBYING 
A. Data 
  The dependent variable measuring the quantity of lobbying occurring is the 
number of lobbying contacts made by firms and trade associations, as defined in Section 
IIIA.  The range of the number of lobbying contacts is 1 to 114.  The independent 
variables are as defined in the previous section, with two exceptions.  The first is that we 
have omitted the cost variables that refer to the cost of organization, because they are not  
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expected to have an impact on the amount of lobbying.7  Second, we have added 
variables that measure the organization.  That is we have included in the dependent 
variables from the previous equations as independent variables in this equation (like a 
recursive model) to examine Hypothesis 6.   
  
B.  Method and Specification 
To estimate these equations, we begin with the assumption that the count 
variables are Poisson distributed.  Unfortunately, two different specification tests 
(Wooldridge 1996, and Cameron and Trivedi 1994) indicate there is overdispersion in the 
data.  Thus we rely on a negative binomial assumption to estimate the model.  We also 
provide the results using a quasi-maximum likelihood estimator.  This estimation 
technique has the advantage of producing consistent estimates of the parameters of a 
correctly specified conditional mean, even if the distribution is incorrectly specified.   
Finally, we provide the estimates from a simple ordinary-least-squares estimator with 
Newey-West corrected standard errors, which provide a basis for comparison. 
A second specification concern is whether error terms are correlated across the 
organizational model and the count model.  We have examined the error correlation 
structure across specifications and can reject the hypothesis of error correlation.   
Moreover, a two-stage least-squares specification imposes a linearity assumption on the 
two equations, which may not be appropriate for the count data here.  Nevertheless, in 
estimates not reported here, we have run the regression using instrumental variables 
techniques, and the signs of the theoretical coefficients of interest do not change. 
                                                 
7 These will serve as instruments in the two stage least squares estimation described below.  
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A third specification concern is related to the differences between small and large 
firms.  For the same reasons elucidated in Section IIIC, we might be concerned about the 
differences in lobbying by large and small firms.  Thus, we have conducted specification 
tests to examine whether there should be a split in the sample.  We can reject at the 95% 
level that these two groups behavior similarly, and thus we present results here of the two 
separate regressions, one for large firms and one for small firms.   
A fourth specification concern relates to outlyers.  Given the skewness of the 
dependent variable, a small number of outlyers may bias the results substantially.  To 
account for this, we ran the regressions at various cutoff points in the data, and the results 
are nearly identical to the results presented here.   
Finally, we considered using the predicted values on organization from the 
previous equation on the right hand side of these count equations.  We think that this is 
not a prudent course to follow because we have no reason to believe that the actual values 
of these variables would be correlated with the error term of these equations, yet they 
would introduce measurement error into the equation.  Nevertheless, we have run the 
regressions with the predicted values and results are roughly the same, with slightly 
stronger results for the organizational effects. 
 
C. Results 
1.  Large Firms 
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  Table 8 presents the results for large firms.  Model 13 presents the base model 
with only the control variables.  Model 14 adds the collective action variables.  Model 15 
also includes the appropriability variable and leakage variable.  Model 16 presents the 
same variables, under a quasi-maximum likelihood estimator.  Model 17 presents an OLS 
estimation.   
  A log-likelihood ratio test shows that Model 14 performs better than Model 13 at 
the 95% level of confidence, and that Model 15 performs better than Model 14 at the 
90% level of confidence.  The QML does not improve explanatory power, and the OLS 
estimation offers results similar to the nonlinear models.  For the purposes of the 
foregoing discussion, we will focus on the full negative binomial model, Model 15.  A 
positive coefficient on the variable means that there is more lobbying; a negative 
coefficient means less lobbying, and the standard errors are below the coefficient 
estimates, with the significance of the coefficient estimates noted. 
  The signs of the coefficients are remarkably stable across the models, suggesting 
some robustness to the results presented.  We begin by focusing our attention on the 
organization variable, PERCENT INTEGRATED LARGE (Hypothesis 6).  In all of the 
specifications, the coefficient on the percentage of large firms is positive as predicted, 
indicating that a shift in organizational form toward an internal or “for-hire” structure 
does result in more lobbying.  Unfortunately, the coefficients never reach the standard 
levels of statistical significance, calling into question the organizational hypotheses 
presented here.   
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  Next we examine the direct effect of the transactional and collective action 
variables on the quantity of lobbying.  The coefficient on WEAK APPROPRIABILITY 
is negative, as predicted, and statistically significant at the 90% level (Hypothesis 5).  A 
one standard deviation move in the variable results in 40% less lobbying, holding the 
remaining variables at their mean values.  The coefficients on all of the collective action 
variables are negative.  SHARED INTERESTS seems to have little statistically 
significant direct effect on the amount of lobbying. The theory predicted a negative 
coefficient (Hypothesis 1). FREE RIDING does negatively impact the amount of 
lobbying that occurs.  This is consistent with a large body of literature emanating from 
political economy that suggests that free-riding problems will result in less lobbying 
(Hypothesis 2).  A one standard deviation increase in FREE RIDING results in 35% less 
lobbying.  Opportunities to correct the free-riding problem through NONMEMBER 
EXCLUSION and UNIQUE BENEFITS do not show statistically significant direct 
effects as hypothesized (Hypotheses 3A and 3B).  Two reasons may underlie this result.  
First, remedies to the collective action problem may not be as effective as has been 
suggested in the literature.  Second, large firms while concerned about collective action 
do not consider remedies in designing the nonmarket organization. 
  The results also indicate that the more large firms are impacted by an issue, the 
more lobbying that will occur.  More importantly, and perhaps consistent with intuition, 
the coefficient on FIRM PROFITS is positive and statistically significant.  A one-
standard deviation increase in the impact the issue has on firm profits will result in 51% 
more lobbying.  Finally, the Common Carrier dockets receive the most attention from the 
lobbyists.  
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2. Small  Firms 
In Table 9, Models 18 through 22 mirror the results for large firms.  The 
coefficients are remarkably stable across error distributional assumptions, and Model 20 
possesses the most explanatory power, so the discussion will focus on this model.  The 
results for the amount of small firm lobbying are somewhat better than the results for the 
organization of small firm lobbying, however, it does seem in this case that the large 
amounts of unobserved heterogeneity persist, causing many results to be insignificant.  
Below, we discuss the statistical results in more detail. 
As with large firms, the coefficient on the organizational variable, PERCENT 
INTEGRATED SMALL, is positive across all specifications, but does not reach 
statistical significance in any specification.  Thus, like in the case of large firms, we can 
reject the hypothesis that organizational form has an impact on the amount of lobbying, 
as hypothesized in the theory section, at the 95% level of confidence. In the direct effects 
of the variables, all the coefficients on the theoretical variables of interest are negative in 
all (but one) specifications, but none of the collective action variables are statistically 
significant.  Although this suggests that free-riding may not be an important 
consideration for smaller firms, it may be due to the other considerations facing small 
firms, which were discussed earlier in the paper. 
The only statistically significant coefficient of theoretical interest is the negative 
coefficient on WEAK APPROPRIABILITY. Its sign suggests that small firms are 
reticent to lobby if they must reveal proprietary and sensitive information in the process.     
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A one standard deviation increase in the independent variable results in 65% less 
lobbying.   
The estimation does find positive and statistically significant effects for small 
firms with issues emanating from the Common Carrier Bureau, the Cable Services 
Bureau, and the Wireless Telecommunications Bureau. In addition, issues that have large 
impacts on the profitability of small firms will receive more lobbying.  The coefficient on 
FIRM PROFITS is positive and statistically significant, as with large firms.  A one 
standard deviation increase in FIRM PROFITS results in 86% more lobbying contacts. 
 
V. DISCUSSION 
This paper takes lobbying data at the level of the lobbying contact, and analyzes 
the determinants of organizational form that lobbying takes and the amount of lobbying 
that occurs.  It statistically examines administrative agency lobbying using actual 
lobbying contacts.  How firms structure their lobbying of the FCC is important because it 
may not only determine the strategies they pursue, but it may also determine the 
effectiveness of those strategies and the potential for externalities.  
We introduced a dataset of ex parte presentations at the FCC, and examine the 
pattern in the organization of corporate lobbying efforts.  We show that large firms, 
which are systematically different from the small firms, act in ways that collective action 
theories and transaction cost theories predict in organizing their lobbying effort, with 
limitations. Consistent with the collective action theory, large firms will tend to organize 
through trade associations when there is shared interests and when the trade association 
offers benefits to members.  Consistent with transaction cost economics, they will attempt  
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to protect information by lobbying internally or through their own agents when there is a 
possibility that sensitive information will leak out through the trade association form of 
lobbying.  Small firms, however, show little systematic behavior; the data provide no 
statistical support to the traditional collective action or transaction cost theories of 
organization.  This may be because the small firms are constrained in their options for 
organization, because of resource constraints and economies of scale considerations.  It 
could also be because smaller firms do not have as sophisticated lobbying strategies as 
large firms.  It may also be due to extreme amounts of unobserved heterogeneity in the 
small firm behavior which make the results difficult to interpret.  We believe it is a 
combination of all three factors, and, as such, a question is worthy of future research. 
The second part of this paper turns to the quantity of lobbying.  Again, the key 
results for large firms are broadly consistent with the conventional theories: large firms 
lobby less in the presence of free-riding.  They also lobby less the higher the probability 
of proprietary information leaking out in the process.  The statistical analysis here shows 
that remedies such as nonmember exclusion and selective benefits to the free-riding 
problem seem to be ineffective for large firms.  This suggests that there may be 
limitations to the literature on clubs and collective bodies as remedies to the free rider 
problem as they apply to the political realm.  Small firms, however, are not responsive to 
the free-riding problem, as the theory has predicted.  They show no increase or decrease 
in tendencies to lobby by the intensity of the free-riding problem, and remedies to the 
free-riding problem do not have a statistically discernible effect on the amount of 
lobbying which occurs by small firms.  Small firms are responsive to the potential 
leakage of their proprietary information, and will lobby less if their proprietary  
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information is at risk.  We must, however, consider these small firm results, especially 
the collective action results, carefully in light of the small firm caveats noted above. 
We hypothesized that the choice of organizational form would have an impact on 
the amount of lobbying that occurred.  The more a trade association form of organization 
was favored, the less lobbying that would result.  In both the large and small firm case, 
the coefficient on the relevant variables was signed as predicted, but never reach 
statistical significance, calling into question this hypothesis. 
Taken together, the results suggest that the structure and conduct of large firm 
lobbying at the FCC is consistent with the predictions of theories of transaction costs and 
the main results of theories of collective action.  However, it suggests that the large firms 
do not change their behavior drastically as structures arise to remedy the free rider 
problem.  Small firms seem to be insensitive to these issues.  On the organizational front, 
they show no sensitivity to collective action issues or transaction cost issues. On the rate 
of lobbying, they show little sensitivity to collective action issues, but do lobby less if the 
have to reveal proprietary information.  In sum, small firms seem to face a “lobby, don’t 
lobby” decision, while large firms choose both the organization and amount of their 
lobbying effort when they do lobby. 
  The paper also points to future research as well.  For example, we lack a good 
understanding of the nature and governance structure of trade associations where small 
and large firm interests are both represented.  In addition, opening up the black box of 
executive-branch agencies, to study how and to whom lobbying is most effective is a 
question that is still unanswered.  Also, understanding the relationship between PAC-
giving and lobbying would help us to understand the relationship between these two  
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forms of political influence.8 Finally, integrating the market aspects of regulatory 
decision-making with the nonmarket lobbying strategy would seem to be a useful area to 
examine.  This paper, integrating political science theories of lobbying with economics 
and strategic management theories of organization, has attempted to begin to tackle this 
agenda. 
                                                 
8 Ansolabehere, Snyder, and Tripathi (2000) have begun to examine this question looking at lobbying 
expenditures and PAC-giving in Congress.  
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TABLE 1: PROPERTIES OF ORGANIZATION FORMS 
FOR LEGAL AND LOBBYING ACTIVITIES 
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TABLE 2:  VARIABLE DEFINITIONS 
 
VARIABLE SUMMARY  DEFINITION 
SHARED INTERESTS  Degree of Shared Interests Amongst Firms 
FREE RIDING  Ability to Free Ride 
NONMEMBER EXCLUSION  Degree of Trade Associations’ Ability to Exclude Nonmembers from Benefits 
UNIQUE BENEFITS  Ability of Firms to Extract Selective and Unique Benefits through Individual Lobbying 
WEAK APPROPRIABILITY  Amount of Proprietary Information that is required to be divulged by a firm to a trade association 
FIRM LEAKAGE  Amount of Proprietary Information that is required to be divulged by a firm to a regulator 
LARGE FIRM COST OF 
ACTION 
Cost of individual lobbying by large firms relative to trade association lobbying 
SMALL FIRM COST OF 
ACTION 
Cost of individual lobbying by small firms relative to trade association lobbying 
COST OF ORGANIZING  Rate of increase in costs of lobbying 
SMALL FIRMS  Percentage of Small Firms Affected by Issue 
LARGE FIRMS  Percentage of Large Firms Affected by Issue 
FIRM PROFITS  Impact on firm profitability 
YEAR  Year of Docket Introduction 
COMMON CARRIER  Common Carrier Bureau 
MASS MEDIA  Mass Media Bureau 
CABLE SERVICES  Cable Systems Bureau 
WIRELESS TELECOM  Wireless Telecommunications Bureau 
ENGINEERING AND TECH  Engineering and Technical Bureau 
PERCENT INTEGRATED 
LARGE 
Percentage of lobbying contacts through integrated form of organization for large firms 
PERCENT INTEGRATED 
SMALL 
Percentage of lobbying contacts through integrated form of organization for small firms 
LARGE COUNT  Count of large firm lobbying contacts 
SMALL COUNT  Count of small firm lobbying contacts 
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TABLE 3:  DESCRIPTIVE STATISTICS 
 
VARIABLE MEAN  STD  DEV 
SHARED INTERESTS  3.08  .81 
FREE RIDING  3.91  .75 
NONMEMBER EXCLUSION  1.14  .38 
UNIQUE BENEFITS  2.79  1.07 
WEAK APPROPRIABILITY  2.18  .78 
FIRM LEAKAGE  2.13  .80 
LARGE FIRM COST OF ACTION  3.56  .77 
SMALL FIRM COST OF ACTION  2.73  .63 
COST OF ORGANIZING  3.06  .80 
LARGE FIRMS  4.13  .94 
SMALL FIRMS  3.60  1.10 
FIRM PROFITS  2.31  .88 
YEAR 1994.7  3.03 
COMMON CARRIER  .485  .50 
MASS MEDIA  .109  .31 
CABLE SERVICES  .069  .26 
WIRELESS TELECOM  .109  .31 
ENGINEERING AND TECH  .079  .27 
PERCENT INTEGRATED LARGE  .36  .43 
PERCENT INTEGRATED SMALL  .34  .42 
LARGE COUNT  5.65  12.20 
SMALL COUNT  4.70  10.19  
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TABLE 4:  CORRELATION MATRIX 
 
 
1  SHARED  INTERESTS  1.00                  
2  FREE  RIDING  0.24  1.00                 
3  NONMEMBER  EXCLUSION  -0.27  -0.60  1.00                
4  UNIQUE  BENEFITS  -0.49  -0.65  0.40  1.00               
5  WEAK  APPROPRIABILITY  -0.31  -0.45  0.58  0.44  1.00              
6  FIRM  LEAKAGE  -0.22  -0.58  0.40  0.61  0.81  1.00             
7  LARGE  FIRM  COST  OF  ACTION  0.33  0.22  -0.13  0.06  0.02  0.10  1.00            
8  SMALL  FIRM  COST  OF  ACTION  0.07  0.21  0.10  -0.15  0.01  -0.20  0.12  1.00           
9 COST  OF  ORGANIZING  -0.01 0.29  -0.06 0.00 0.20 0.01 0.44 0.52 1.00                   
10  SMALL  FIRMS  0.54 0.24  -0.28  -0.27  -0.22  -0.07 0.58 0.12 0.22 1.00                 
11  LARGE  FIRMS  0.46 0.33  -0.10  -0.48  -0.30  -0.42 0.19 0.48 0.27 0.60 1.00               
12  FIRM  PROFITS  -0.28  -0.35 0.37 0.52 0.56 0.60 0.22 0.14 0.24 0.00  -0.13 1.00             
13  YEAR  0.21  -0.04 0.03 0.10 0.03 0.10 0.16  -0.12 0.07 0.06 0.01  -0.11 1.00           
14  COMMON  CARRIER  0.06  -0.26 0.35 0.14 0.42 0.45 0.11  -0.23  -0.22 0.14  -0.06 0.31 0.03 1.00         
15 MASS  MEDIA  0.14  0.08 -0.14 -0.13 -0.16 -0.14 -0.01 -0.06 -0.03 -0.03 -0.05 -0.12 -0.18 -0.34  1.00       
16  CABLE  SYSTEMS  0.19 0.14  -0.11  -0.31  -0.09  -0.17 0.05 0.18 0.17 0.11 0.15  -0.14 0.10  -0.26  -0.10 1.00     
17 WIRELESS  TELECOM  -0.09  0.21 -0.09 -0.07 -0.12 -0.16 -0.03  0.07  0.15 -0.05  0.02 -0.16  0.19 -0.34 -0.12 -0.10  1.00   
18 ENGINEERING  AND  TECH  -0.12  0.06 -0.07  0.09 -0.12 -0.12 -0.14  0.15  0.05 -0.20 -0.03 -0.15  0.07 -0.28 -0.10 -0.08 -0.10  1.00 
                     
   1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9  10  11  12  13  14  15  16  17  18 
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TABLE 5:  ESTIMATION OF THE ORGANIZATION OF LOBBYING  
BY LARGE FIRMS 
 
Dependent Variable:  PERCENTAGE INTEGRATED LARGE = non-trade association lobbying 
on a given issue divided by total lobbying on the issue 













































































































































































































          
N 101  101  101  101  101  101 
Log  Likelihood  -71.40 -65.56 -63.64 -87.79  -64.26   
R-Squared         .3387 
** 95% confidence interval 
* 90% confidence interval 
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TABLE 6:  LARGE FIRM TENDENCY TO ORGANIZE LOBBYING 
 
Variable  Shift in Probability Toward Internal 
Organization 
Shared Interests  -14%** 
Free Riding  -28%** 
Nonmember Exclusion  -16%** 
Unique Benefits  -9% 
Weak Appropriability  +16%* 
Firm Leakage  -22%* 
Note:  This table measures the effect a one standard deviation move in the independent variable will have on 
probability of organizing internally. 
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TABLE 7:  ESTIMATION OF THE ORGANIZATION OF LOBBYING  
BY SMALL FIRMS 
 
Dependent Variable:   PERCENTAGE INTEGRATED SMALL = non-trade association 
lobbying on a given issue divided by total lobbying on the issue 













































































































































































































            
N 101  101  101  101  101  101 
Log Likelihood  -71.68  -68.13  -67.20  -92.09  -68.16   
R-Squared           .2459 
** 95% confidence interval 
* 90% confidence interval 
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TABLE 8:  ESTIMATION OF THE COUNT OF LOBBYING  
BY LARGE FIRMS 
 
Dependent Variable:   LARGE COUNT = count of lobbying contacts on the issue 
 MODEL  13 MODEL  14 MODEL  15 MODEL  16 MODEL  17 





































































































































































       
N  101 101 101 101 101 
Log Likelihood  -245.50  -239.90  -238.29    -238.73 
R-Squared       .2381   
** 95% confidence interval 
* 90% confidence interval 
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TABLE 9:  ESTIMATION OF THE COUNT OF LOBBYING  
BY SMALL FIRMS 
 
Dependent Variable:  SMALL COUNT = count of lobbying contacts on the issue 
 MODEL  18 MODEL  19 MODEL  20 MODEL  21 MODEL  22 






































































































































































       
N  101 101 101 101 101 
Log Likelihood  -248.70  -242.87  -238.10    -277.01 
R-Squared       .1842   
** 95% confidence interval 
* 90% confidence interval  
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APPENDIX 1: QUESTIONS FOR EXPERTS 
 
 
NonMarket Strategy in Telecommunications 
 
For each issue in the attached spreadsheet, rate on a 1 to 5 scale each statement below for that 




1.  Shared Interests:  Large segments of the industry (a majority of firms) share the same 
interests or side of the issue.  
 
2.  Free Riding:  If a trade association lobbied on this issue, the benefits of passage or defeat of 
this regulation(s) would be conveyed to large segments of the industry, irrespective of 
whether they were involved in the trade association or not.  In other words, free-riding is 
possible because the trade association cannot localize the benefits to only its members. 
 
3.  Nonmember Exclusion:  If a trade association lobbied on this issue, you should be a 
member of a trade association to be included in the benefits of passage or defeat of this 
regulation(s). 
 
4.  Unique Benefits:  An individual firm can obtain unique benefits from passage or defeat of 
this regulation(s).  (For example, it could realistically expect the Commission to specifically 
exclude it or small class of firms like it, from adhering to the regulation.)  
 
5.  Weak Appropriability:  If the trade association lobbied on the firm’s behalf, the firm would 
be required to divulge sensitive or proprietary information that might put it at a competitive 
disadvantage relative to other members of the trade association. 
 
6.  Firm Leakage:  If the firm lobbied on its own behalf, the firm would be required to divulge 
sensitive or proprietary information at some point in the lobbying process that would become 





7.  Large Firms:  This issue relates to many large firms in the industries affected (1=<20%; 
2=20-40%; 3=40-60%; 4=60-80%; 5=80%+) 
 
8.  Small Firms:  This issue relates to many small firms in the industries affected (1=<20%; 
2=20-40%; 3=40-60%; 4=60-80%; 5=80%+)  
 
9.  Large Firm Cost of Action: If there were no trade association, and each firm individually 
lobbied on this issue, the large firms would generally find the benefits from their lobbying to 
be higher than their costs of lobbying.  
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10. Small Firm Cost of Action: If there were no trade association, and each firm individually 
lobbied on this issue, the small firms would generally find their benefits from lobbying to be 
higher than their costs of lobbying. 
 
11. Cost of Organizing:  The total cost of organizing on this issue (through a trade association) 
increases, at an increasing rate, with the number of firms. 
 
12. Firm Profits:  The issue has a very large impact on the profitability of firm(s) and threatens 
survival of firm(s).  
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APPENDIX 2: ISSUES BEFORE FCC THAT REPORTED EX PARTE 
PRESENTATIONS JANUARY –FEBRUARY 1998 
 
CC 80-286 Establishment of Joint Board 
CC 85-166 Investigation of Special Access Tariffs of Local Exchange Carriers 
CC 90-6 Cellular Service  
CC 91-141 Expanded Interconnections  
CC 91-281  Caller Identification Service 
CC 91-35 Operator Service Access and Pay Telephone Compensation  
CC 92-115  Public Mobile Services 
CC 92-235  Private Land Mobile Radio Services 
CC 92-237  North American Numbering Plan 
CC 92-297  Local Multipoint Distribution Service 
CC 92-77  Billed Party Preference 
CC 94-1 Price Cap Performance  
CC 94-102  Emergency Calling System 
CC 94-129  Consumers Long Distance Carriers 
CC 94-54 Commercial Mobile Radio Services 
CC 94-97  Expanded Interconnection 
CC 95-116  Telephone Number Portability 
CC 95-155   Toll Free Service Access Codes 
CC 95-182  Alascom, Inc. 
CC 95-184  Telecommunications Services-Inside Wiring 
CC 95-185   Interconnection between LECs and CMRS Providers 
CC 96-115  Consumer Proprietary Network Information 
CC 96-128  Pay Telephone Reclassification 
CC 96-149  Implementation of Non-Accounting Safeguards 
CC 96-150  Accounting Safeguards 
CC 96-158  Southwestern Bell Telephone Co. 
CC 96-160 Expanded Interconnection Offerings 
CC 96-262  Access Charge Reform 
CC 96-45  Universal Service 
CC 96-61  Interstate, Interexchange Marketplace 
CC 96-98   Local Competition Provisions 
CC 97-11  Implementation of Section 402(b)(2)(a) of Telecom Act 
CC 97-112 Commercial Mobile Radio Services  
CC 97-121  In-Region, InterLATA Service in Oklahoma 
CC 97-137  In-Region, InterLATA Service in Michigan 
CC 97-146 Competitive Access Providers  
CC 97-149 1997 Annual Access Tariff 
CC 97-151  Pole Attachments 
CC 97-158 Southwestern Bell Telephone Company 
CC 97-160  Economic Cost Studies 
CC 97-160  Universal Service -Forward Looking Mechanism for High Cost Support 
CC 97-172 Ex Parte and Pleading Cycle Procedures Established 
CC 97-208  InterLATA Service in South Carolina 
CC 97-211  Special Authority To Transfer Control 
CC 97-213  Communications Assistance for Law Enforcement Act 
CC 97-219 Petition for Preemption-Discriminatory Ordinances, Fees and Right-of-Way Practices  
CC 97-249 Beehive Telephone Company Beehive Telephone, Inc., Nevada  
CC 97-250 Tariffs Implementing Access Charge Reform   
CC 98-11 Petition of Bell Atlantic Corporation for Relief from Barriers to Deployment of Advance Telecommunications Services  
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CS 92-260 Cable TV-Cable Home Wiring  
CS 95-184  Telecommunications Services Inside Wiring;Customer Premises Equipment 
CS 96-83 Broadcast and Multichannel Multipoint Distribution Service  
CS 97-151  Implementation of Section 703 (e)-Pole Attachments 
CS 97-206 Technical Requirements To Enable Blocking of Video Programming 
CS 97-248  Implementation of the Cable TV Consumer Protection and Competition Act of 1992 
CS 97-55  TV Ratings System 
ET 93-62  Radiofrequency Radiation 
ET 94-124 New Radio Applications 
ET 95-18   Mobile Satellite Service 
ET 95-183  37.0-38.6 GHz and 38.6 - 40.0 GHz Bands 
ET 95-19 Digital Devices 
ET 97-214  Allocate the 455-456 and 459-460 MHz bands 
ET 97-94 Amendments of Parts 2,15,18, et al.   
ET 97-99  Digital Electronic Message Service 
FO 91-171 Emergency Broadcast System 
FO 91-301 Technical Improvements 
GN 89-573 Regional Public Safety Plan; Philadelphia, PA  
GN 90-7  Regional Public Safety Plan; Wash. DC 
GN 93-252  Regulatory Treatment of Mobile Services 
IB 95-59 Satellite Earth Stations  
IB 96-111  Domestic and International Satellite Service 
IB 96-220  Non-Geostationary Mobile Satellite Service 
IB 96-261  International Settlement Rate Benchmark 
IB 97-142  Rules and Policies on Foreign Participation 
IB 97-95  Allocation and Designation of Spectrum 
MD 96-186  Annual Regulatory Fees for Fiscal Year 1997   
MM 87-268  Advanced TV Systems 
MM 87-7  Television Satellite Station Policies 
MM 91-221  TV Broadcasting 
MM 92-264 Cable Ownership Limits, Cross- Ownership and Anti-Trafficking  
MM 93-25   Direct Broadcast Satellite Service Obligations 
MM 94-150 Attribution of Broadcast Interest  
MM 95-176 Video Programming  
MM 96-16  Broadcast EEO Rules and Policies 
MM 96-222 Broadcast TV Ownership Rules  
MM 97-138 Broadcast Television and Radio Stations  
MM 97-182   Preemption of State and Local Zoning and Land Use Restrictions 
PR 93-253 Private Land Mobile Radio Services  
PR 89-552 Use of 220-222 MHz  
PR 93-144  SMR Systems 
WT 94-148  Terrestrial Microwave Fixed Radio Services 
WT 95-157  Microwave Relocation 
WT 96-6  Flexible Service Offerings 
WT 96-86  Development of Operational, Technical, and Spectrum Requirements 
WT 97-112   Commercial Mobile Radio Services 
WT 97-153  Private Land Mobile Radio Services 
WT 97-182  Preemption of State and Local Zoning and Land Use Restrictions 
WT 97-192  Procedures for Reviewing Request for Relief from State and Local Regulations 
WT 97-207  Calling Party Pays Service Option 
WT 97-81  Multiple Address Systems 
WT 97-82  Competitive Bidding  
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